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Background Abusive Traffic
Internet Abusive Traffic
Abusive traffic abounds on the Internet:
e.g. email, phishing, malware, DoS, CAPTCHA solvers, etc.
Botnets are a significant source of abusive traffic
Large potential for damage
Botnets becoming increasingly sophisticated (motivated
economically, politically, militarily)
e.g. distributed C&C, layers of obfuscation, re/mis-direction, etc.
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Background Abusive Traffic
Botnet Arms Race
Attackers, scammers and thieves quickly adapt to defenses. Most
effective solutions exploit fundamental weaknesses of attackers
Some Current Approaches:
Reputation (e.g. blacklist) ... response: dynamic, fresh addresses
Attack signatures ... response: polymorphism, etc.
C&C signatures ... response: distributed C&C, encryption, etc.
Communication structure of C&C ... response: mimic humans
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Background Abusive Traffic
Our Research
Transport-level (e.g. TCP) traffic signal analysis:
Distinct from current practice and research ( 6= Netflow analysis)
Key insight: local botnet behavior manifests remotely as
discriminative signal
Exploit lowest-level dependence: sourcing large amounts of data
(whether for spam, scam-hosting, attacks, etc).
Funded in part by: Cisco University Research Grant and the NSF.
Thanks to NPS ITACS for supporting this research.
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What is the transport (TCP/IP packet stream) character of spam?
Are there differences between spam and ham flows?
How to exploit differences in a way which spammers cannot easily
evade?
Why ask this question?
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Detecting Bot-Generated Spam
Transport-Level Characteristics of Spam
Two Observations
1 Low Penetration:
due to existing filters, user ambivalence
→ huge volumes of spam
2 Sending Method:
Botnets
→ Low asymmetric bandwidth, widely distributed
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Detecting Bot-Generated Spam
Transport-Level Characteristics of Spam
Combining Observations: Low Penetration + Sending Methods












Contention manifests as TCP/IP loss, retransmission, reordering, jitter,
flow control, etc.















Not looking at IP header
Not looking at data
SpamFlow: TCP stream, incl
timing
(look at combining methods later)
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Detecting Bot-Generated Spam TCP and SMTP Transport
A Brief Diversion on TCP/IP
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP):
Reliable, bi-directional, in-order byte transmission abstraction
Acknowledgments
State Machine
Flow and congestion control
Reacts to loss, persistent congestion
Multi-flow fairness and efficient resource utilization (AIMD)
Round trip time (RTT) estimation
Bandwidth probing
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Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP) uses TCP for transport
Sequence of SMTP handshaking between Mail Transport Agents
(MTAs)
Mail contents are packetized
How do Spam Connections Behave?
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Detecting Bot-Generated Spam Building intuition
How do Spam Connections Behave?
...or, a quick look at netstat
RcvQ SndQ Local Foreign Addr State
0 0 srv:25 92.47.129.89:49014 SYN_RECV
0 0 srv:25 ppp83-237-106-114.:29081 SYN_RECV
0 0 srv:25 88.200.227.123:25068 SYN_RECV
0 0 srv:25 92.47.129.89:49014 SYN_RECV
0 0 srv:25 ppp83-237-106-114.:29084 SYN_RECV
0 0 srv:25 88.200.227.123:25068 SYN_RECV
0 0 srv:25 88.200.227.123:25069 SYN_RECV
0 0 srv:25 88.200.227.123:25070 SYN_RECV
0 0 srv:25 88.200.227.123:25074 SYN_RECV
0 0 srv:25 84.255.150.15:4232 SYN_RECV
0 25 srv:25 222.123.147.41:50282 LAST_ACK
0 28 srv:25 adsl-pool-222.123.:1720 LAST_ACK
0 31 srv:25 222.123.147.41:50152 LAST_ACK
0 15 srv:25 222.123.147.41:50889 LAST_ACK
0 9 srv:25 88.245.3.19:venus LAST_ACK
0 25 srv:25 78.184.155.70:1854 FIN_WAIT1
0 23 srv:25 190-48-30-225.spe:50920 FIN_WAIT1
0 23 srv:25 dsl.dynamic812132:48154 FIN_WAIT1
0 23 srv:25 ip-85-160-91-16.e:48093 FIN_WAIT1
0 23 srv:25 88.234.141.158:48389 FIN_WAIT1
0 23 srv:25 p5B0FBB5D.dip.t-d:11965 FIN_WAIT1
...
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TCP Stuck in States





Remote MTAs that send
FIN and disappear
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From: "Dr. Beverly, MD" <b@ex.com>
Subject: thoughts
Dear Robert,
I hope you have had a great week!
Received: from unknown (59.9.86.75)
From: Erich Shoemaker <ried@ex.com>
Subject: Repl1ca for you
A T4g Heuer w4tch is a luxury statement
on its own.
In Prest1ge Repl1cas, any T4g Heuer...
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Detecting Bot-Generated Spam Building intuition
Results
CEAS 2008:
“Exploiting Transport-Level Characteristics of Spam” [BS08]
Offline analysis
Utilize statistical machine learning methods
Demonstrate > 90% accuracy, precision, recall (w/o content or
reputation!)
Correctly identify ≃ 78% of false negatives from content filtering
alone
See paper for details...
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Lots of “plumbing,” i.e. exposing transport-features to higher layers
Training a supervised learner
USENIX LISA 2011:
“Auto-learning of SMTP TCP Transport-Layer Features for Spam
and Abusive Message Detection” [KBY11]
Built a SpamFlow plugin for SpamAssassin
Did the “hard” work









From Josephine@rsi.com Tue Feb 01 23:21:58 2011
Return-Path: <Josephine@rsi.com>
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on ralph.rbeverly.net
X-Spam-Level: **




Received: (qmail 30920 invoked from network); 1 Feb 2011 23:21:57 -0000
Received: from cm-static-18-226.telekabel.ba (77.239.18.226:37689)
Received: from vdhvjcvivjvbwyhxnscvfwq (192.168.1.185) by bluebellgroup.com (77.239.18.226)
with Microsoft SMTP
Message-ID: <4D489025.504060@etisbew.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2011 00:20:48 +0100
From: Essie <Essie@hermes.com>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.12)













A “replayer” to emulate real-world load
Utilizes a modified dummynet to emulate real-world network
Reads a corpus (Enron, NIST TREC, etc)




Central problem in any supervised learner – how to train?
We utilize the auto-learning functionality in SpamAssassin:
SpamAssassin returns a continuous score based on many, many
tests
If other modalities (e.g. keywords, rule tests) indicate strong
possibility of spam (high score) or ham (low score), use that as an
training example
Incrementally build the model
Requires no human labeling or work!




Auto-learning thresholds based on spam distribution (normal,
µ = 16.3, δ = 7.7)
τ+ = 16 and τ− = 1
Yields training of 2,685/5,510 (48.7%) spam and 267/416 (64.2%)
ham messages
Experiments using Naive Bayes, C4.5 decision trees, SVM
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Current Research
Current Research
Lots of On-going Work:
1 Ph.D student, 1 graduating MS student, 2 current MS students
Beginning work on 3yr NSF award (SDCI)
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Current Research
Current Research
Application to Other Domains:
Attacks (automated) against web servers
Can’t rely on reputation and/or ports (as compared to SMTP
spam)
Detecting Botnet Hosting Infrastructure:
Botnet CDNs – same requirements!
Support scams (e.g. Canadian pharma)
Provide mis/re-direction (Fast-Flux DNS, HTTP redir, proxying,
etc)
Capt Le Nolan to present next (from USENIX Security, 2011)




Adversarial learning to combat e.g. classifier poisoning
Adversarial TCP/IP stack to cause suspected bot to perform more
work, contributing to the feedback loop such that transport
features are exacerbated
Hardware deployment in NetFPGA, etc.
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